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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED
THE STATE TO AMEND THE INFORMATION TWO DAYS
BEFORE TRIAL

Nelson-Waggoner asserts that the trial court prejudiced and impeded his
substantial constitutional rights such as the rights to fundamental fairness and due
process, and the right to present a defense—his theory of the case—to the jury by
allowing the State to amend the information two days before trial. The State incorrectly
interprets this issue as being the ability to prepare for trial (Br.App. at 9-11).
The State claims that Nelson-Waggoner waived his right of review because the
record is silent as to any discussion or objection as to this issue (Br. Appellee at 7).
While the record is silent as to any specific objection two days before trial, NelsonWaggoner repeatedly petitioned the trial court for a bill of particulars/motion to require
specification of date and time of offense, and the trial court specifically stated that it
would not allow the State to change the information because it previously failed to
narrow the date down any further (R. 196; 467; and 9/21/99 Tr. at 40-43). NelsonWaggoner asserts that this Court should nonetheless review this issue under a plain
error analysis or in the alternative under an "exceptional circumstances" standard due
to the unique procedural circumstances of this case. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996), cert,
denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997); see also State v. Scott, 447 P.2d 908, 910 (Utah
1968) ("[T]here may be exceptional circumstances when errors not excepted to are so
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clearly erroneous and prejudicial to the fundamental rights of a defendant that an
appellate court will of its own accord take notice thereof.")-

A.

The trial court plainly erred when it accepted the State's theory of the case
by allowing the state to amend the information two days before trial, thus
eliminating Nelson-Waggoner's ability to question the credibility of K.W.
before the jury.
Nelson-Waggoner asserts that the trial court plainly erred when it stripped him

of his right to present an alibi defense and of his right to question the credibility of
K.W. before the jury regarding her preliminary hearing testimony, thereby impeding
his substantial constitutional rights.
To demonstrate plain error, Nelson-Waggoner must establish the following: "(i)
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful...." State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, f 18, 34 P.3d 187 (citation
omitted). In order to show that the error is harmful, Nelson-Waggoner must
demonstrate that "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79 at f 18.
The State cannot amend the criminal information for the purpose of avoiding the
defendant's alibi defense. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). The
degree of variance regarding the alleged date of offense which might affecl the
credibility of the witness and the weight to be given her statements is a question for the
jury. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394 (Utah, 1982). Furthermore, "It is the exclusive
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function of the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Webb, 740 P.2d
65, 84 (Utah App. 1990); see also State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1997) ("The
judging of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is exclusively
the prerogative of the jury").
Nelson-Waggoner asserts that in order for this Court to properly analyze this
issue it is necessary to review the procedural history of this case set forth in his original
Brief of Appellant, p. 21-27. Summarily, the alleged victim, K.W., testified at the
preliminary hearing that she was "definitely sure" the incident occurred on Sunday,
November 24, 1996—the weekend before Thanksgiving (10/15/97 Tr. at 16). But the
initial criminal information alleged the incident occurred on or about "November 17 to
November 30, 1996" (R. at 2). Nelson-Waggoner made repeated requests for a bill of
particulars/more specification as to the date and time of offense, but the State claimed it
could not narrow the dates down any further (R. at 196; 471; 9/21/99 Tr. at 40). In
light of the State's failure to specify a date of the offense, the trial court stated that the
State is "precluded from having testimony as to the exact date at the time of trial" and
"if they [the State] have further information forthcoming at trial, they're precluded
from presenting it. That's the reason for the rule [bill of particulars]" (9/21/99 Tr. at
40-43).
After these events took place, Nelson-Waggoner filed a notice of alibi, indicating
his intent to show that on November 24, 1996, he was out of the state and not with the
alleged victim (R. at 523-24). After Nelson-Waggoner filed his notice of alibi, giving
3

solid proof that K.W.'s preliminary hearing testimony was incorrect, the trial court
allowed the State, two days before trial, to amend the criminal information and narrow
the date to November 17, 1996 (R. at 52).
Although the State had previously claimed it could not narrow the alleged dates
in the criminal information, the trial court allowed the State to do so anyway. The
record demonstrates that the only new information that was possessed by the State
which would cause them to seek an amendment of the original information was the
solid evidence that Nelson-Waggoner was out-of-state from November 21-December 3,
1996. After learning of this solid alibi, the State's theory then shifted from the incident
occurred on a Sunday "before Thanksgiving" between November 17-November 30, to
the incident must have occurred on November 17 because Nelson-Waggoner was outof-state on November 24.
The trial court completely accepted the State's theory of the case by allowing the
information to be amended to solely "November 17, 1996." Not only did this allow the
State to circumvent Nelson-Waggoner's request for a bill of particulars, but it also
stripped him of his alibi defense and eliminated his ability to question the credibility of
K.W. and her preliminary testimony that the incident occurred on November 24.
In State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771 (Utah 1985), the defendant was originally
charged by information which alleged that the he sexually abused a child "on or about
the 4th day of February, 1984." Id. at 772. Two weeks later, after the State learned of
the defendant's alibi defense to the dates charged, the State amended the information
4

alleging that the offense took place "on or about the first two weeks in February,
1984." Id. At pretrial, the defendant moved for a bill of particulars, but it was denied.
Id.
The defendant in Robbins argued that the trial court committed prejudicial error
in refusing to grant a bill of particulars to specify when the alleged offense occurred
because he could not prepare an adequate alibi defense for every day. Id. at 773. This
Court held that "under the circumstances, the defendant was entitled to know whether
the change in the information was made in good faith or to avoid the defendant's alibi
defense." Recognizing that "children are often not able to identify with a high degree
of reliability" when an event in the past took place, this Court nevertheless held that "it
is the duty of the trial court to require the State to give the defendant the best
information it has as to when the alleged crime took place," and that this defendant was
entitled to a narrower time period "and to some explanation for the change in the
allegation in the information." Id. However, this Court affirmed the conviction
because the defendant did not provide this Court with a trial transcript and thus could
not show prejudicial error. Id.
In State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1982), this Court referred to State
v. Bayes, 47 Utah 474, 155 P.2d 335 (1916), where there was a question as to whether
a 16-year old girl was raped on a Wednesday, or on a Saturday. This Court held in
Bayes:
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The act, if occurred at all, was quite unlawful on Wednesday, the 7th, as on
Saturday, the 10th, of the month. Such a discrepancy might become material in
a case where the statute of limitations was important; but, under the
circumstances of this case, the only effect it could have was that it might have
affected the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given her statements,
and that question was for the jury.
Wilson, 642 P.2d at 396 (quoting Bayes, 155 P.2d 335).
Thus, Robbins clearly stands for the principle that when the State amends a
criminal information, it must be done in good faith and not for the purpose of avoiding
a defendant's alibi defense. Further, a discrepancy on the date of an alleged offense
which affects the credibility of the witness is a question for the jury, not for the trial
court. See Wilson, 642 P.2d at 396.
In the case at bar, the State had previously asserted that it could not narrow the
date down any further from November 17-November 30, 1996, and the record is absent
of any new information obtained by the State other than Nelson-Waggoner's alibi
defense. It is clear that the State amended the information solely because of NelsonWaggoner's alibi for November 24. With Nelson-Waggoner's alibi defense, the State's
theory of the case changed, and either K.W. was completely mistaken about NelsonWaggoner, or she was completely mistaken about the date of the incident, although she
previously testified she was "definitely sure" it occurred on November 24, 1996
(10/15/97 Tr. at 16).
However, rather than allow the jury to decide when and if the assault occurred
based on all the evidence—including K.W.'s preliminary hearing testimony and Nelson-
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Waggoner's alibi evidence, the trial court adopted the State's theory of the case by
allowing the information to be amended to a particular date. This effectively stripped
Nelson-Waggoner of his ability to effectively question K.W.'s credibility and to have
his theory of the case heard.
Nelson-Waggoner asserts that he was prejudiced by this error and absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. Because the trial
court amended the information and accepted the State's theory of the case, it effectively
deprived Nelson-Waggoner a critical opportunity to question K.W.'s credibility and to
present his theory of the case to the jury. K.W. was the State's main witness against
Nelson-Waggoner and the only witness that testified the he was involved in the assault.
By accepting the State's theory of the case, the trial court prejudiced and impeded
Nelson-Waggoner's substantial constitutional rights such as the right to fundamental
fairness and due process, and the right to present a defense—his theory of the case—to
the jury.

B.

This Court should review this error under the "exceptional circumstances"
doctrine for manifest injustice or alternatively, for manifest injustice under
Rule 19(e).
A review of the procedural history shows that this case involves "rare procedural

anomalies" that amounts to manifest injustice. "There may be exceptional
circumstances when errors not excepted to are so clearly erroneous and prejudicial to
the fundamental rights of a defendant that an appellate court will of its own accord take
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notice thereof." State v. Scott, 22 Utah 2d 27, 28, 447 P.2d 908, 910 (1968).
Alternatively, this Court may review this issue in order to avoid manifest injustice as
defined by Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or for plain error as set
forth in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Jury instructions not
objected to may be reviewed "to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 19(e).
Summarily, K.W. testified at the preliminary hearing on October 15, 1997, that
she was "definitely sure" that the incident took place on Sunday, November 24, 1996,
the weekend before Thanksgiving, yet Nelson-Waggoner was bound over for trial on
information alleging the date to be on or about "November 17, 1996, to November 30,
1996" (10/15/97 Tr. at 16; R. at 2, 48-49).
Next, Nelson-Waggoner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars on September 2,
1999, requesting that the State specify with particularity the "place, date and time of the
commission of the offense against [K.W.]" (R. at 196). On October 1, 1999, NelsonWaggoner filed a Motion to Require Specification of Date and Time of Offense (R. at
467).
Then, at a hearing to consider the motion for a bill of particulars on September
21, 1999, the State maintained its position that it could not specify the exact date of the
offense, although K.W. earlier testified that it was on November 24, 1996 (9/21/99 Tr.
at 40-43). On October 12, 1999, at another hearing to consider Nelson-Waggoner's
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other request for a bill of particulars and for specification of date and time of offense,
the prosecutor stated:
We have never said...that [K.W.'s] going to testify that it was the 17th. I
happen to believe that this occurred on the 17th, but she hasn't told us that's
what she's going to testify to. My anticipation is that she will either say it was
the 24th or that it was on of—or consistent with her original was to police, that
she's not sure which day it was.
(10/12/99 Tr. at 19-20).
After Nelson-Waggoner filed his Notice of Alibi, the State filed an Amended
Information changing the date of offense from "November 17,1996, to November 30,
1996" to "November 17, 1996" (R. at 52). During trial at opening argument, counsel
for the State specifically mentioned that the offense occurred on November 17, 1996
(1/10/00 Tr. at 154). Although a stipulation was read to the jury which established that
Nelson-Waggoner was in Arizona from the night of November 21 until December 3,
1996, this point was irrelevant because the jury was instructed that the date of offense
was November 17, 1996 (1/10/00 Tr. at 98; R. at 238).
These events show rare procedural anomalies and manifest injustice which
justifies a review by this Court. It is certainly abnormal for the trial court to refuse to
grant several requests for a bill of particulars due to the State's claim that it cannot
narrow down any further the alleged date of the offense when the only alleged victim
already testified it occurred on a specific date. Moreover, the trial court then allows,
two days before trial, the State to amend the information only after Nelson-Waggoner
presents a solid alibi defense that he could not have committed the offense on the date
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alleged by K. W. And then at trial, the trial court accepts the State's theory of the case
by instructing the jury that the alleged offense occurred on November 17, 199.
Although Nelson-Waggoner repeatedly attempted to force the State to narrow
down the date of the alleged defense, the trial court denied these motions by stating that
the State was "precluded" from presenting any forthcoming information at trial
regarding the further narrowing of the alleged date of offense because it previously
failed to do so when given sufficient notice and opportunity (9/21/99 Tr. at 40-43).
However, after Nelson-Waggoner provided a solid alibi defense, the trial court reneged
on its position that the State would not be allowed to change the information, even at
trial.
The trial court's acceptance of the State's theory of the case by instructing the
jury that the alleged offense occurred on November 17, 1996, allowed the State to
circumvent Nelson-Waggoner's repeated attempts for a bill of particulars, even though
the trial court previously stated that the State would be precluded from talking about a
specific date to the jury through statement or testimony. This rare procedural anomaly
eliminated Nelson-Waggoner's ability to effectively attack the credibility of K.W. and
prejudiced his substantial rights by eliminating much of his alibi defense because the
jury instruction rendered this defense irrelevant. Additionally, by instructing the jury
that the alleged offense occurred on November 17, the trial court overstepped its
authority and eliminated the jury as fact finder as to when and if the assault occurred.
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Thus, the trial court erred in submitting to the jury that the alleged offense
occurred on November 17, 1996, and this error should have been obvious to the trial
court. As shown above in point A, it is the duty of the jury, not the trial court, to
determine a discrepancy on the date of an alleged offense which affects the credibility
of the witness. See Wilson, 642 P.2d at 396. Moreover, the State did not amend the
criminal information in good faith considering that the only new information it obtained
as to the alleged date of the offense was Nelson-Waggoner's solid alibi and therefore
the amended information was done solely to avoid Nelson-Waggoner's alibi defense.
The trial court adopted the state's theory of the case by instructing the jury as to
the date of the offense which resulted in a manifest injustice that prejudiced NelsonWaggoner 's substantial constitutional rights. This plain error was harmful because
Nelson-Waggoner's conviction was based solely on the testimony of K.W. The State
offered no physical evidence of any assault and Nelson-Waggoner was severely limited
in questioning K.W.'s credibility and effectively impeded from presenting his theory of
the case to the jury.
Accordingly, Nelson-Waggoner asks this Court to reach the merits of this issue
under the plain error doctrine, or under the exceptional circumstances doctrine, or
under the manifest injustice standard of review. The trial court clearly erred in
allowing the State to amend the information in this case two days before trial and erred
in instructing the jury as to the date of offense and these procedural anomalies
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prejudiced Nelson-Waggoner's substantial constitutional rights and require a reversal of
his conviction.

II.

NELSON-WAGGONER WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COMPETENT AND EFFECTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL

Nelson-Waggoner asserts that trial counsel's performance was objectively
deficient and that he was harmed by these deficiencies.

A.

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to amendment of the
information.
As explained above and as explained in Nelson-Waggoner's original brief, the

trial court erred when it permitted the State to amend the information. Should this
Court decline to review the issue set forth in Point I, Nelson-Waggoner asserts that this
Court should examine this issue in regards to whether his trial counsel was ineffective.
Rule 4(d) of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not permit amendment of
information before the verdict if it prejudices any substantial right of the defendant. In
light of the procedural history of the case, the preliminary hearing testimony of K. W.,
the repeated attempts of the defense for a bill of particulars/more specification of date
and time of offense and the trial court's decision to deny that request but to preclude the
State from eliciting a specific date through statement or testimony, trial counsel's
failure to object to the amendment and to the jury being instructed only as to November
17th date constitutes a deficient performance.
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Moreover, contrary to the position of the State, Nelson-Waggoner was
prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance. First, had trial counsel objected to
the amendment of information and pointed out the fact that it is the duty of the jury to
determine when and if the incident occurred and to determine the credibility of K. W. in
light of her preliminary hearing testimony and Nelson-Waggoner's alibi defense, the
trial court probably would have dismissed the State's motion for amendment of
information. Second, had Nelson-Waggoner been tried under the original information
and been given the opportunity to present his theory of the case and to question K.W. 's
credibility in light of her preliminary hearing testimony, there is a reasonable
probability "but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). But the jury was
denied this opportunity and still took about 4.5 hours to deliberate before reaching a
verdict (Br.Aplt. at 5).

B.

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution's
numerous indirect references to Nelson-Waggoner's failure to testify made
during closing argument.
The State's closing argument contained at least 10 indirect references to Nelson-

Waggoner's failure to testify which were highly inflammatory and prejudicial. These
numerous comments invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from NelsonWaggoner's silence and trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to
object to these comments or ask the trial court for a curative instruction. Because
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Nelson-Waggoner's conviction was based solely on the testimony of one witness,
K.W., with no physical evidence to support her physical assault accusation, the
prosecution's comments constitute constitutional error that was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
1.

The prosecution's comments during closing argument were
inappropriate and infringed on Nelson-Waggoner's Fifth Amendment
rights.

The numerous indirect references made by the prosecution during closing
argument were intended to leave the jury with the impression that because NelsonWaggoner did not testify, he must be guilty and the alleged victim's accusations must
be true. These numerous indirect references could reasonably be interpreted by the
jury to draw an adverse inference from Nelson-Waggoner's silence. See State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 547, 554 (Utah 1987).
In the case at bar, the State claims that the numerous indirect references made by
the prosecution during closing argument refered to the defense witnesses' inability to
explain where Nelson-Waggoner was on November 17, 1996 (Br.App. at 21-26). The
State claims that comments one through five and nine were a "fair response to defense
counsel's opening statement," comment six "referred to evidence that could have been
supplied by defense witnesses other than defendant," and comments seven, eight, and
ten were "fair rebuttal to defense counsel's closing argument (Br.App. at 27-28).
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The State further refers to several cases, attempting to show why each of these
indirect references to Nelson-Waggoner's silence were "fair." However, these cases
are distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
In Tillman, the defendant claimed that the prosecutor indirectly commented on
his failure to testify at trial, although he failed to make contemporaneous objections to
the allegedly improper comments. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 553. There were only a few
comments made by the prosecution that can be construed as indirect comments on
defendant's failure to testify at trial, thus implying guilt (the full extent is cited in the
original brief). The most blatant indirect comment on defendant's silence was where
the prosecution referred to defense counsel arguing that the criminal system had failed,
and the prosecution stated:
No system in the world will work without the person himself humility-wise and
with remorse saying, T want it to work,' and you haven't heard Elroy Tillman
say that. In fact, if you have looked at Elroy Tillman you probably haven't seen
one ounce of remorse other than to cast blame on the State's witnesses or the
system or his being black or whatever else you want to characterize the blame
as.
Id. at 554. This Court held that this remark and a few others would not "naturally and
necessarily [be] construed by a juror as a comment on defendant's silence." Id.
Further, assuming that the comments constituted a constitutional violation, this Court
determined that the prosecution's indirect comments about the defendant's silence for
not taking the stand were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 555. In making
this determination, this Court reviewed the fact that the evidence of defendant's guilt
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was "overwhelming," "the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive," and the
trial judge specifically instructed the jury "that no presumption adverse to [defendant
Tillman] is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness
stand." Id, at 555.
In State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), the prosecution made a single
comment which the defendant claimed prejudiced his right not to testify. At closing
argument, the prosecutor stated:
I heard no evidence, evidence [sic] from the witness stand about coercion or
about inducing somebody to say anything about something that didn't happen. I
heard no evidence that supports any other theory in this case than the theory that
was presented by the State of Utah, that he's guilty of first degree murder.
Id, at 891. This Court affirmed the conviction, finding "the comment was made in the
context of focusing the jury's attention on defendant's confession," and "the statement
was isolated." Id,
In State v. Bailey, 111 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985), the defendant argued that a single
comment made by the prosecution, "Have we heard any testimony in this case that says
that the analysis done by [the Officer] on these fingerprints is incorrect?", constituted
prejudicial error. Id, at 285. This Court found that this statement "was not a reference
to the defendant's failure to testify but rather, taken in context, was a comment on the
weight of the evidence." Id, at 286. Moreover, even assuming that the single comment
was improper, this Court found it was not prejudicial because "of the other evidence
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establishing the defendant's guilt...., defense counsel objected to the comment, and the
trial judge immediately admonished the jury not to consider the statement." Id.
The State also cites several non-binding decisions to support its claim that the
prosecutor's indirect comments were fair. In Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1141
(Indiana 1997), the defendant claimed that the prosecution's comment in closing
argument constituted reversible error. Id, at 1148. The prosecutor made the comment
after informing the trial judge and defense counsel at a bench conference "that he
intended to tell the jury there had been no evidence presented to explain why the
defendant would confess to a crime he didn't commit." Id. The defense objected but
the trial judge allowed it. Id. The prosecution "continued his closing argument and
reminded the jury that he had told them in his opening statement that the defendant
confessed to killing the four victims with his shotgun. He stated it was self-evident
'that no one freely and voluntarily confesses to a murder unless they're guilty.' He then
challenged defense counsel to explain why a person would voluntarily confess to a
crime they did not commit." Id. The court found "the jury in this case could not
reasonably have interpreted the prosecutor's comments as suggestion to infer guilt from
the defendant's silence." Id. at 1149. Moreover, the state presented "substantial
evidence of the defendant's guilt," and even if the comments had been in error, they
would have been harmless. Id. at 1149 n. 10.
The State also refers to State v. Williams, 490 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio, 1986), where
the prosecution stated the following during closing argument:
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Here they [witnesses] come in and testify to you what this man [appellant] told
them. And, again, ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, they [appellant] tell you
they [witnesses] were lying, but they offer no evidence to rebut that. They could
have brought somebody through those door and put them on the stand and say,
'No, [the witnesses] were lying. It never took place.' There is absolutely no
evidence to contradict what they testified to, ladies and gentlemen.
Id. at 910. The court held "A reference by the prosecutor in closing argument to
uncontradicted evidence is not a comment on the accused's failure to testify, where the
comment is directed to the strength of the state's evidence and not to the silence of the
accused," and affirmed the conviction. Id.
Further, in State v. LeFever, 313 S.E. 2d 599 (N.C. App. 1984), the prosecution
commented "several times that the evidence was 'uncontradicted.' He farther
commented, 'There has not been any evidence you have heard but what you find she
has told you the truth.'" Id. at 603. The North Carolina Court of Appeals took the
position that "a bare statement to the effect that the State's evidence is uncontradicted is
not an improper reference to the defendant's failure to testify," and found no prejudicial
error. Id. (citations omitted).
The State also cites Davis v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1095 (Ind. App. 1997), to
support its position (Br. App. at 17). However, in Davis, the prosecution's indirect
comments about the defendant's failure to testify were found improper. Id at 1098. The
prosecution made "several" indirect comments about defendant not testifying, "the
most troubling" being "[Defendant] said he took the car. There is nothing to controvert
that. There is no evidence saying that isn't so. There's not even an argument that he
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didn't say that." Id. The defendant argued that since he and the witness were the only
witnesses able to testify about the incident, "any comment on the uncontradicted nature
of the State's case necessarily highlights for the jury his failure to testify." Id. at 1097.
The Indiana Court of Appeals determined that "a reasonable jury could have taken that
comment as an invitation to consider [defendant's] failure to testify as an inference of
guilt....The prosecutor's comments were improper." Id. at 1098.
In State v. Adamson, 680 P.2d 1259 (Ariz. App. 1984), the prosecution
allegedly made a single indirect comment on the defendant's right not to testify. The
Arizona Court of Appeals did not find "the prosecutor's comment was adverse in this
case."/d. at 1261.
All of the cases cited by the State to support its claim that the ten indirect
references to Nelson-Waggoner's silence were fair are factually distinguishable from
the present case. In Tillman, Carter, and Bailey, the prosecution's comments were not
considered prejudicial based on essentially three factors: 1) the overwhelming evidence
of defendant's guilt, 2) the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive, and 3) the
trial judge gave a curative instruction. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 555; see also Carter,
776 P.2d at 891; and see Bailey, 111 P.2d at 286. However, in the case at bar,
Nelson-Waggoner's conviction was not based on overwhelming evidence since it was
based solely on the testimony of one witness, and the State offered no physical evidence
of an assault. Moreover, the prosecution's comments were extensive as opposed to
isolated where he indirectly referred at least ten times to Nelson-Waggoner's silence (in
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Carter and Bailey, there was only a single comment). And, the trial judge did not give
any curative instruction to the jury; he only read the jury instructions.
The non-binding cases cited by the State are also distinguishable on factual
grounds. In Ben-Yisrayl, the defendant confessed to the crime and the prosecution's
statements regarded this confession and the lack of evidence to put this confession in
doubt. Ben-Yisrayl, 690 N.E.2d at 1148. Further, the conviction was affirmed because
of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. Williams and Adamson regard only a single,
indirect comment about defendants' failure to testify which was directed towards the
weight of the evidence. See Williams, 490 N.E.2d at 910; see also Adamson, 680 P.2d
at 1261. Again in LeFever, that court held "a bare statement to the effect that the
State's evidence is uncontradicted is not an improper reference to the defendant's
failure to testify." LeFever, 313 S.E. 2d at 603.
These cases are factually distinguishable because Nelson-Waggoner never
confessed, there was not overwhelming evidence of guilt, and the prosecution made at
least ten indirect references to his silence, not just a single, isolated reference. The
rhetorical impact of these numerous comments is serious because it lead the jury to
draw an adverse inference from Nelson-Waggoner's silence. Nelson-Waggoner's trial
counsel was deficient for not objecting to these prejudicial comments.
The State further argues that comments were fair because of defense counsel's
opening statement and closing argument (Br.App. at 15). The State claims that the
numerous indirect comments regarding Nelson-Waggoner's silence regarded the
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defense witnesses' failure to contradict K.W.'s testimony (Br.App. at 21-28).
However, a close review of all the indirect inferences to Nelson-Waggoner's silence
and the comments surrounding each incidence shows that the prosecution was doing
more than just pointing out the defense witnesses' failure to explain where NelsonWaggoner was on November 17, 1996. The prosecution repeatedly stated to the jury
that no one but K.W. told you what went on that day and that has not been
controverted. These statements repeatedly enforced in the jurors' minds that NelsonWaggoner did not testify and therefore he must be guilty.
2.

Nelson-Waggoner was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient
performance.

First, for the above reasons and the reasons outlined in the original brief, the
prosecution improperly commented on Nelson-Waggoner's failure to testify. Second,
the evidence of Nelson-Waggoner's guilt was based on a single witness with no
corroborating physical evidence. There was also evidence negating K.W.'s credibility,
but the trial court effectively impeded the jury from considering this evidence when it
accepted the State's theory of the case.
Finally, the State relies on non-binding precedence that is distinguishable from
the facts of this case to support its claim that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt (Br.App. at 31). In United States v. Gray, 87 F.3d 1315, 3, 1996
WL 294455 (6th Cir. 1996), the prosecution made a single, isolated indirect remark on
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defendant's failure to testify, whereas in the present case, the prosecution made at least
ten indirect comments on Nelson-Waggoner's failure to testify.
Thus, the numerous indirect comments were not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and Nelson-Waggoner's trial counsel's failure to object to these comments was
prejudicial.
3.

The decision not to object was not reasonable trial strategy.

The State claims that defense counsel's performance was not deficient because it
was "sound trial strategy" and in the alternative, it was "invited error" (Br.App. at 3132).
Defense counsel's failure to object was not sound trial strategy. In defense
counsel's response for a motion for new trial, he explains that he did not object to
prosecution's comments because he felt:
The prosecutor made no such direct reference to the defendants failure to testify,
but made a series of references which in defendant's opinion, when taken in
total, clearly demonstrate that the prosecution was calling the attention of the
jury to the fact, that only one person could have provided the answers to refute
the testimony of the alleged victim, [K.W.], and that was the defendant.
(R. 349-50). Then, defense counsel states that he did not object to the prosecution's
closing statements for several reasons: (1) he did not want to interrupt the prosecutor;
(2) he felt the curative instruction had little effect; and (3) the cumulative effect of the
prosecutors statements, coupled with the knowledge that the parties now have that the
jury was at least at one point during the proceedings, dead-locked (R. 350).
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Thus, defense counsel did not object because he did not consider the prejudicial
statements harmful until after he saw that the jury was dead-locked and after he
reviewed the record and saw, according to defense counsel, the "cumulative effect" of
the numerous references to Neslon-Waggoner's failure to testify.
Moreover, this Court specifically forbid defense counsel from waiting until after
the verdict and then raise the motion for a new trial based on the prosecutor's improper
comments. See State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982). The law is clear that
any objection must be made before the verdict to allow the judge an opportunity to cure
any inappropriate comments made by the prosecutor; defense counsel's failure to timely
object prejudiced Nelson-Waggoner and denied him his Fifth Amendment rights.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, NelsonWaggoner asks this Court to reverse his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, a first
degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [U_ day of June, 2003.

Margaret Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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